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Abstract
We examine how changes in the unemployment rate affect demand for
college education, demand for different fields of university study and de-
grees’ admission thresholds. We use panel data for applications submitted to
the universe of undergraduate programs in Greece that span seven rounds of
admission cohorts combined with a degree-specific job insecurity index, and
time series on youth (ages 18-25) unemployment. We find that degree- and
major-specific job insecurity turns applicants away from degrees and majors
that are associated with poor employment prospects. Results indicate that
the steep increase in the unemployment rate that started in 2009 is asso-
ciated with an increase in the number of college applicants. The effect is
heterogeneous across fields, with an increase in the demand for degrees in
Psychology as well as for entrance to Naval, Police and Military Academies,
and a decrease in the demand for degrees in Business and Management. We
also find that the business cycle changes degrees’ admission thresholds by
affecting their popularity.
Keywords: demand for education, college major, unemployment, job inse-
curity, admission thresholds
JEL Classification: I26, J24
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1 Introduction
Students may alter their decisions regarding post-secondary education during eco-
nomic turmoil. The consequences of graduating in a recession are associated with
long-term, negative effects on earnings (Kahn, 2010; Wee, 2013; Oreopoulos et al.,
2012). Previous studies have shown that economic fluctuations affect human cap-
ital investment including college enrollment (Hershbein, 2012), college comple-
tion (Kahn, 2010) and graduate school attendance (Bedard and Herman, 2008;
Johnson, 2013). The business cycle rearranges the production factors within an
economy, causing some sectors to prosper and others to shrink. The short- run
oscillations in the growth of various sectors change the available job opportuni-
ties, and therefore, the popularity of different college majors. Economic turmoil
might affect the labor- market prospects of different professions in different ways,
and thus, influence college applicants’ expected returns from the related college
majors. These differences could be large. For example, Joseph et al. (2012) show
that the income gap of students specializing in different majors could be as large
as the income gap between high school and college graduates.
The choice of college major is a good predictor of future earnings. During a
recession, students might re-consider their expectations about future career paths
and the earnings potential associated with a specific college major. Thus, switch-
ing majors could imply significant changes in a student’s lifetime income. A large
literature focuses on understanding which factors may affect students’ choice of
college major (Montmarquettea et al., 2002; Arcidiacono et al., 2010; Beffy et al.,
2011; Dickson, 2010; Wiswall and Zafar, 2011; Porter and Umbach, 2006). This
literature has examined how students form expectations about earnings and career
prospects associated with a specific college majors, and how these expectations
affect students’ educational choices. This literature has largely focused on a static
framework, or has been based on the analysis on a single cohort. However, the
effect of the business cycle on students’ preferences for the field of study or the
major they select has received little attention. In this paper, we use new data on
admission applications received by the universe of undergraduate degree programs
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in Greece that span seven rounds of admission cohorts to examine the following
two research questions: Do changes in unemployment affect college applicants’
preferences for selected university fields? Do these differences in students’ prefer-
ences affect college admission thresholds?
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, we examine if the busi-
ness cycle affects students’ self-reported preferences for certain university degrees
and majors. We proxy business-cycle fluctuations with a job-insecurity index as-
sociated with university degrees, and with the unemployment rate. Second, we
undertake what we believe to be the first analysis of data on the universe of college
applications and all public tertiary education institutions for an entire country,
rather than for applications to departments of a specific university. Our data
encompass degree applications submitted by every student who decides to pursue
tertiary education nationwide over a period of seven years. Because the Greek
system asks students to submit college applications in order of preferences, that
specify the desired field of study at a specific university, we know how students
rank their degree applications. In particular, we know which application is a
student’s top-, second-, third-, and later-choice indicating most, second-, third-,
and later-most preferred degree choices. Third, we believe our work is the first to
examine the effect of students’ degree preferences on degree’s entry requirement
(i.e. admission threshold). Our analysis controls for field, campus city, time and
university unobserved heterogeneity.
The crisis in Greece represents one of most severe economic events in the
developed world since the Great Depression. Although Greece’s GDP had started
to decline in 2008, austerity measures taken in late 2009 resulted in a very abrupt
and deep deceleration of the economy. Two characteristics of the Greek crisis
made the downturn distinct in modern times: First, Greece experienced the most
severe drop in GDP of any developed country not involved in a war. Second, the
Greek recession was so widespread that if affected virtually every industry and
every profession.
In this paper, we explore the short-run impact of a recent financial crisis on
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the demand for post-secondary education in Greece. As the economic conditions
deteriorate, people might adjust their education decisions. Preliminary figures
from the OECD suggest that the crisis led more young adults to seek for post-
secondary education. According to the OECD (2016), the share of the Greek
population ages 25 to 34 with a post-secondary degree grew from 32.5 percent in
2011 to 40.1 percent in 2015 - a level that nonetheless remained below the OECD
average of 42.1 percent. In this paper, we investigate how the crisis altered demand
for available college majors, and changed admission thresholds. We argue that
the business-cycle can redistribute degrees in terms of popularity and difficulty
in gaining admission for the degrees (admission thresholds) that lead to various
career prospects.
To examine these effects, we use a novel data set from Greece that includes
information on college applications and admission thresholds for different de-
grees. In this way, we uncover information about students’ most preferred sub-
jects/degrees for the period 2005-2011, a time that preceded and includes the
opening chapter of the economic crisis. We deliberately focus on the early effects
of the recession on college application. As the recession progressed, changes in
institutional settings as well as changes in the quality of college education due
to financial constraints, may have exacerbated the recession’s effects. Thus, by
focusing on the early years of the recession we avoid the potential of additional
uncertainty due to changes in such possible confounding factors - key issues that
might make disentangling the short-run variation in demand for college education
challenging. Our study is the first one to identify the relationship between youth
unemployment and the demand for specific college degrees nationwide, while net-
ting out supply-side dynamics. By analyzing college applications we are able to
examine which fields and degrees are the most popular at different stages of the
business cycle.
Two features of the analysis bear mention: First, this study focuses on the
effect of the recession on students’ preferences over university fields rather than
their actual college major enrolment decisions. In a setting where the supply
4
of university places is exogenously determined and fixed, we can only examine
changes in the popularity of each department rather than changes in the num-
ber of students who actually enrol in each field. Although the actual number of
students who matriculate in each university department each year is relatively
stable, the number of applications each department attracts across years varies
significantly. Second, we are able to look at the effect of unemployment on stu-
dents’ top choice (most preferred) degree applications, because college applicants
complete an ordered list of preferred university departments (for a field of study at
a specific academic destination). All students are required to report their degree
applications with a ranking of each preference. In our dataset, we observe the
order of all applications each degree attracts. As a results, we are able to provide
detailed, stylized facts about the demand for college education, and specific fields
of study that students report as their most-preferred degrees.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the institu-
tional background. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the drivers
of the decision to apply to college. Section 5 provides analytical evidence. Section
6 discusses our results. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Greek Post-secondary Education System
2.1 How do students participate in the college admission process?
College admission in Greece is based on a centralized system, and students are
admitted directly to departments within universities. Many other countries, such
as Chile, China, Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey, use the same or similar centralized
application systems for post-secondary education. Students apply to a major
and university simultaneously (e.g. Chemical Engineering at the University of
Athens)1 as part of a centralized, score-based application process. Each university
1Similar systems include the state university system in California (see http://admission.
universityofcalifornia.edu/how-to-apply/index.html, https://secure.csumentor.edu/
support/pdfs/express_app.pdf, Chilean universities (Hastings et al., 2014) German univer-
sities (Braun et al., 2010), and Chinese universities (Chen and Kesten, 2013)
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department in Greece offers a single undergraduate degree program, and transfers
to a different degree are not allowed at any stage. We refer to an institution-major
combination as a degree. Most degrees at these institutions require four or five
years to complete on time. College degrees are linked to specific occupations.
Access to some occupations is restricted to graduates with specific college degrees.
For example, in order to become a licensed tourist guide in Greece one must obtain
a college degree in History or Archaeology. Thus, preferences over college majors
are strongly related to preferences over occupations.
In Greece, high school graduates and twelfth-grade students who aspire to
pursue tertiary education take national exams in May, and their university ad-
mission score 2 is the sole criterion for college admission. The same admission
process applies to returning high school graduates.3
Students usually take national exams in five common subjects (Language,
Mathematics, Physics, Biology, History) and four compulsory, track-specific sub-
jects. There are three tracks: Classics, Natural (or Exact Sciences) and Technical
Studies (or Information Technology). Students can apply to university depart-
ments that are relevant to their track. For example, students outside the Classics
track cannot apply to Law schools. Goulas and Megalokonomou (2015) describe
the process in detail. Once the results of the national exams are announced, stu-
dents are required to submit a list, ranking in order the university departments
to which they would like to be admitted. The only way a student can avoid this
university admission procedure is by not submitting a list of preferences. This
might be the case for students who apply to undergraduate programs abroad.4
2The university admission score combines the national and school exam scores a student
receives in twelfth grade. The national exam scores receive much heavier weight in the calculation
of the university admission score than the school exam results.
3Returning high school graduates could keep their school exam score and retake the national
exams any year after school graduation.
4These students take national exams but they do not submit a preference list. In this way,
these students do not participate in the college application process.
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2.2 How do they apply to specific university departments?
Submitting a ranked list of preferred university department is equivalent to sub-
mitting an application to each university department in the list. A centralized,
computerized system at the Ministry of Education ranks students by their admis-
sion scores, and assigns the highest ranked student across the country to her top
choice. The algorithm then moves to the second-highest ranked student across
the country, and assigns her to the first department in her list in which there is
an available place, and so on. Essentially, college admission functions like a queue
where the choicest university program offers admission to the highest-performing
student that has placed this degree in her preference list.
At the end of this process, every department announces the grade of the
student with the lowest score it admitted in that year. This grade is considered
to be the “admission-threshold score” or “cut-off score” in that year. Each degree
has its own admission-threshold score. Students are accepted to specific degrees
if and only if their admission score is above the cut-off. Thus, it is more difficult
to gain admission to departments with higher admission thresholds. Each year,
each university department admits a fixed number of applicants every year, as
determined by the Ministry of Education. There is only one admission cycle,
conducted every year in July. College education in Greece is free of charge for
undergraduate students, and there are no pre-admission scholarships that could
encourage a student to apply to a certain department instead of another.
Submitting a list is a prerequisite for participating in the university admission
process. There is no room for gains from strategic misreporting of preferences.
The ordering of university departments in the preference list is very important
for a student because once a student gains admission to a specific university
department, he cannot enroll in a university department in a lower position. Stu-
dents report their preferences prior to the announcement of the degrees’ admission
thresholds and the admission outcomes. When a student completes her preference
list, she is aware of previous years’ threshold scores and the ranking of degrees
based on previous years’ threshold values. A student is aware of her own score
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and the distribution of national exam scores but she is not aware of the threshold
score of each department in the same year in which she applies. Nevertheless,
a student does have incentives to aspire to university departments that report
higher threshold admission scores in previous years than her own admission score.
This is the case because admission thresholds vary from one year to another, and
listing additional university departments does not involve any financial cost for
the student. In this way, students in any given year have incentives to report
potentially all university departments they desire to consider for admission and
are relevant to their tracks.
In general, students have preferences for specific degrees. For example, a
student who aspires to study Economics could potentially list all university de-
partments that offer a degree in Economics in her preference list. In a framework
of cost-less applications, each individual who desires to study Economics has in-
centives to include every Economics department in their preference list. Thus,
every department could potentially receive an application from every applicant
who desires to study the same major. Potentially, the only thing that differs from
one preference list to the next applicant’s list is the ordering of degrees. 5
What determines a degree’s admission threshold? The most important deter-
minant is the demand for the specific degree as derived from students’ top choice
applications. Receiving many top choice applications makes the degree more pop-
ular and induces a higher competition for the available seats. In this case, the
admission score of the last admitted student (which is equivalent to the cut-off
score) is usually higher when there is more competition. The Ministry of Educa-
tion can also affect the admission threshold by changing the number of available
university seats. Reducing the supply of degree seats is an indirect way to accept
only the highest-achieving students who have listed this specific degree. Thus,
the admission score of the last admitted student will be higher, which increases
the admission threshold.
Reporting a degree in any position except the top ones in one’s preference list
5There might be students that have stronger preferences for a city than a degree. For example,
a student might list degrees that are offered only in Athens and are relevant to his track.
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does not necessarily affect a degree’s admission threshold. Students might report
degrees in lower positions in their preference list because they want to make sure
that they will gain admission to some degree course, even if they are not actually
committed to enroll. These students might never actually affect the admission
threshold score because they might gain admission to a degree higher on their
list, and so, at that point, they are no longer under consideration for any other
degree course, or part of the process that leads to a degree’s threshold determi-
nation. The algorithm that the Ministry of Education runs provides a unique
application outcome6 for each student based on his own ordered preferences, his
admission score, and everyone else’s ordered preferences and admission scores.
Once students’ ordered preferences are submitted, the algorithm produces only
one possible admission outcome for each student. We call this “application out-
come” and it is a unique combination of university department for each student.
Students who change their minds after submitting their preference lists, and thus
want to choose a degree course other than the algorithm match have to reapply for
admission the next year. This is the case even if the other degree course is listed
in a lower position that the one allocated to them by the Ministry of Education.
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for students who participated in the
university admission process between 2005 and 2011. More than 80 percent of
college applicants were admitted to some degree program. On average, students
apply to 24 university departments/degree programs, and they gain admission to
the choice that ranks eighth on their list. As indicated in Figure 1, the number of
degrees students put on the preference list, and the students’ rank for the degree
program to which she ultimately gains admission change slightly across time.7
Almost 70 percent of admitted students enroll in a university department that is
in another city, and 56 percent of applicants are female students. The average
cohort size is 62,257 students. In the period we study, on average, 60,257 students
gain admission to any university department. It is also interesting to mention that,
on average, 89 percent of applicants are new high school graduates, while the other
6The outcome refers to the degree course in which he is allowed to enroll in that given year.
7We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point into our attention
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11 percent have graduated from school in the past and are reapplying for college
admission. A student might reapply to college for two reasons. First, she might
not have been accepted to any university department in the past. Second, she
might have previously been accepted to a university department, but decided to
apply for admission to a different degree program.
3 Data
We examine the effect of a recession on college-major preferences by using college
application data prior to and shortly after the beginning of the recent financial
recession. We use a new and unique data set that contains administrative in-
formation from the Ministry of Education on the number of college applications
for the universe of undergraduate degree programs offered in Greece from 2005
to 2011. We use panel data for the universe of undergraduate degree programs
over a period of seven years. This data set contains college applications by both
recent and returning high-school graduates who wish to enroll in tertiary educa-
tion. In addition, we observe how many university departments were operating in
each year, the fields in which the universities offered degrees, and the city of the
campus location.
Because students report preferences prior to their admission outcomes and
their enrolment decisions, our data on reported preferences are unconditional on
college admission. Actual enrollment may change with changes in the number of
slots available in each degree program over time. The Ministry of Education has
the entire control over the supply of university seats. We also pull annual data
on youth unemployment from the World Bank statistical reports.
We obtained individual level data from the Ministry of Education for each
student who applies to college from 2005 to 2011. This dataset includes: gender
and age of each applicant, the type of school (public, private, urban) each student
attended, if a student is a new high school graduate or a returning student8, if
8We refer to applicants who have previously graduated from high school as “returning stu-
dents”
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the student is admitted to some university department, each student’s application
outcome, number of degrees listed in each student’s preference list and order of
application outcome, students’ annual national exam score, and the supply of
seats per year. Figure 2 shows the number of college applicants who apply for
college admission from 2005 to 2011. After 2009, the number of college applicants
rises sharply and above the respective increase in new high school graduates. In
Figure 3, we disentangle the pool of college applicants into two groups: new high
school applicants and returning students, and we look at how these two numbers
change over time. There are more returning students after 2009.
Table 2 provides information about the number of university departments
operating in each field and each year. Here, we categorize university study fields
into 22 broad, major groups.9 It is interesting to observe that supply of university
departments is relatively stable across years for each field. Over the seven years
included in our data, 481 university departments operate for the complete time
frame, and 24 university departments operate for fewer years.10 No university
department closes during the sample period.
Data on the degrees’ admission thresholds are publicly available, and we ob-
tained them from the Ministry of Education. We were unable to fully match the
two datasets because some degree programs changed their names, some used dif-
ferent university identifiers in certain years, and other values are missing in the
public documents. However, we obtained information on the degree cut-off score
of 2,746 combinations of degrees and years.
4 The Argument
In this section we are considering the factors that, in our view, substantially drive
education-related decision making in the period marking the beginning of the
9The are 21 categories and a category named “Other”. In “Other” we put some degrees that
are not associated with any of the remaining 21 categories, for example special religion studies.
10Specifically, one university department operates for six years; two university departments
operate for two years; two university departments operate for four years; three university de-
partments operate for five years; and sixteen university department operate for three years.
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recent Greek crisis. This period offers a particularly interesting window into the
decision-making process of applicants because the degree of economic turmoil is
so pronounced that it almost certainly influences the potential pursuit of post-
secondary education, and because these effects are likely to be heterogeneous for
different sectors and professions.
4.1 Contextual influences
Our first point concerns contextual influences on the decision to apply to col-
lege. We group students into three categories based on the way the students
make education-related decisions. In Greece, as elsewhere, one group of students
come from families that strongly intend to send them to tertiary education and
sometimes push them to pursue a particular academic or professional path - due
to income, attitudes, professional and social status, and other factors. For these
children, preferences regarding college education, in general, and about specific
potential college majors have been formed or induced in advance of the time they
actually apply to college. For those individuals, job-market conditions in the par-
ticular years involved likely have little or nothing to do with their predetermined
college attendance and choice strategies (which may in itself take into account
employment wages, status, and the like). We call these applicants “ strategic
applicants”.
Next, there is a set of students who, either because of attitudes or socio-
economic status, are less committed to a college application strategy, and most
likely they respond more strongly to current information regarding the costs and
benefits of college education. Following Nakata and Mosk (1987) we call the
students in this set “marginal applicants”. Between these two groups is a third
category, students who are less committed to attaining a post-secondary education
than the “ strategic” group, but who are not part of the “marginal” group. These
“core applicants” reach a decision over a significant number of years, and, as a
result, they are less influenced by the exact economic conditions for the years in
which they apply to college. Such individuals probably constituted a significant
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fraction of school-goers in Greece around the beginning of the recent financial
crisis because household income per capita had increased substantially in the two
decades prior to the beginning of the debt crisis in late 2009, when household
income per capita had reached what a peak. Presumably the improvement in
real family disposable income played an important role in allowing the children
of these households to pursue college educations. We believe that changes in the
unemployment rate might mainly affect “marginal applicants” and much less so
the third category of applicants.
4.2 Returns to education
Our second argument concerns returns to education. The job market11 in Greece
operates essentially like a queue. That is, persons seeking employment for the
first time compete for jobs in a system in which the best-educated person is first
in line for the choicest job position. The crisis led to layoffs and job rationing and
overall conditions that increased competition for employment. To improve their
employment prospects, students invest in more years of education; the same may
be true for those who were not students when the crisis began - those who had
found a job previously - possibly shortly - before the crisis, but were forced by
payroll cutbacks into unemployment and ultimately led back towards additional
education. Thus, in times of gloomy job market prospects, we hypothesize, an
overall increase in the demand for college education is to be expected, ceteris
paribus. Moreover, the drop of salaries across industries and job functions brought
about by the crisis altered college applicants’ anticipated post-graduation returns
to education overall, and to specific college degrees. Graduates of all degrees
saw their benefits reduced compared to the pre-crisis era; as a result, candidates
began to reconsider each college major’s expected costs and benefits, causing a
reformulation of preferences or education in general as well as among specific
college degrees.
11We refer to all jobs ie. public and private sectors
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4.3 Quality of tertiary education
Our third argument is related to the quality of tertiary education provided during
the crisis. During the first years of the recession, changes in the ratio of students
to faculty, research work, and facilities are unlikely to affect candidates’ decision
regarding college application. It was still very early and the general view was that
the crisis will not last long. We are not worried about price effects related to the
direct college costs (e.g., tuition and fees) because students in Greece do not pay
tuition fees and even the books are provided to them for free.
In countries where tertiary education is not free, the recession could affect stu-
dents’ willingness and ability to obtain a student loan, and thus, could also affect
students’ decisions over a specific college or major based on costs. In such coun-
tries, concerns that surfacing over whether mounting education debt and students’
inability to repay their loans will be the next big economic bubble to burst Cronin
and Horton (2009). Douglas (2016) estimates that the present discounted value
of attending college for the median student varies between $85,000 and $300,000
depending on the student’s major. This is less of a concern in Greece because
every tertiary education institution is public, and free post-secondary education
is a constitutional right.
A concern would be that students are less able to study in another city, be-
cause, after 2009, their parents are more likely to face difficulties in covering the
cost of living. Again, we believe that in the early years of the crisis households
had not experiences a considerable drop in their purchasing power. However, as
the crisis progressed, after 2012, this financial inability to cover living costs is
likely to restrict students options. We believe that potential education quality
effects may exist after 2012 because many universities had to cut back on funds
for research and facilities. Also, quantity rationing of slots, both overall and in
specific degrees, took place, and were of paramount importance for applicants to
university departments. Nevertheless, in our study we are able to net out any
quantity effects by looking at self-reported preferences among specific degree pro-
gram choices made by candidates prior to the outcome of their college application.
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To summarize, current economic circumstances as well as expectations over
returns to education and quality of education constitute crucial information for
decisions concerning college applications during the recent recession.
5 Analytical Evidence
In this section we explore some of our hypotheses statistically, using both simple
tables depicting time series of data, as well as regression analysis. We follow the
universe of university departments in Greece which is also identical to the set
of available college majors; this is because university department offers exactly
one college major, although the same major may be offered by more than one
department in different universities.
5.1 Time series statistics
Table 3 combines the supply of specific fields with the demand for specific fields.
For each field and year we report a measure of weighted popularity for each field
(d) that is constructed in the following way:
WeightedPopularityIndexf,t =
# of applications received as number one choicef,t
# of existing degreesf,t
To calculate the weighted popularity index 12, we divide the number of appli-
cation each department receives as number one choice over the number of existing
departments in each field and we look at the evolution of this index over time.
Table 3 shows the weighted popularity index over time for various fields. For
instance, in 2005, on average, 181 college applicants list economics as their top
choice. In the same year, each department in Law receives on average 871 appli-
cations reporting a Law department as their top choice. The weighted popularity
index clearly reflects relative preferences of college applicants across fields. For
12An alternative to the weighted popularity index would be the total number of applications
a degree receives in a given year. However, it would not take into account possible changes in
the supply of existing degrees.
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example, a Dentistry department receives more applications listing it as top choice
compared to a Veterinary department, given their supplies of degrees. Given that
the supply of degrees in each field is relatively stable across years (Table 2), if we
observe considerable changes in the weighted popularity index within fields over
time, they will be caused by changes in the number of applications submitted to
each degree this year (demand side). For example, in Social, Political and Euro-
pean Studies the relative changes in the weighted popularity index over time are
not as large as the relative changes for Naval Academies over time. We also find
that each degree across fields attracted on average 174 top-choice applications in
2005, indicated by the mean number of applicants variable.13 The mean number
of applications drops from 2005 to 2009 and then it increases.
5.2 Regression analysis
In this section we investigate the effect of the recent recession on the demand
for fields of study at the university level, and for changes in degrees’ admission
thresholds. Using OLS, we examine how changes in the unemployment rate affect
the demand for degrees or fields that have different employment prospects.
5.2.1 Job insecurity
We compile information on job prospects and job insecurity– that is, the fear of
involuntary job loss – from a series of long-term surveys of college graduates in
Greece published in Katsikas (2006)14. This information is used to construct an
index of employment prospects of different college degrees, based on the structure
of the Greek economy and year specific factors. For each university department,
the index takes a value between 1, 2, 3, indicating good, mediocre and poor
employment prospects. Katsikas (2006) stresses that the index is the result of the
amalgamation of information from the career offices of all universities, the Hellenic
13The mean number of applications is the ratio of total number of applications submitted each
year over the number of existing university departments in a given year
14This book acts as an informational guide for college applicants.
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Bureau of Statistics, the OAED15 employment observatory, and various labor
unions. The index is intended to represent differences in structural and frictional
unemployment among those with available college degrees and, most importantly,
time-specific labor market conditions. As a result, it captures the economic and
employment prospects associated with a degree in that year. Degrees with a low
job insecurity index imply more available and stable employment conditions than
degrees that are characterised by a high job insecurity index. The latter imply
poor employment prospects, a higher difficulty to find a job and a higher risk of
job loss.
Although this job insecurity index is provided for year 200616, it is still inter-
esting to exploit across-field variation in this index and examine if job insecurity
has an effect on the demand for college education. Intuitively, the demand for
university majors that are tied to jobs with low job insecurity might increase.
Good employment prospects might make a profession more appealing. Similarly,
the popularity of college majors that are related to professions that face poor
employment prospects might drop. This might affect professions subject to cuts
in salaries or higher unemployment rate than other professions. These conditions
create insecurity about a particular profession, sector or field of study. By re-
stricting our sample to the year 2006, we exploit across-university and across-field
variation in the job insecurity index to examine if job insecurity associated with
a specific degree or field of study affects demand for college education.
In particular, we investigate the effect on job insecurity on college demand
with the following regression model:
Yd,f,c = b0 + b1JobInsecurityp + b2UniversityFEu + b3CityFEc + d,f,c (1)
where [p]=degree or field of study
where Yi,f,c,t indicates the number of applications a particular degree d in field
f and city c attracted that reported it as top, second or third choice.
15OAED is the Greek Manpower Employment Organization.
16We managed to find the book published in 2006. This book is published every year providing
information about the current degree-specific job insecurity index. However, it is not easy to
find the book for previous years, but only the current one.
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The coefficient of interest is b1, indicating how job insecurity affects demand
for college degrees. The job insecurity index could refer to the expected employ-
ment prospects a specific degree or a specific field yields. In all specifications, we
use campus-city fixed effects to control for unobservable time-invariant character-
istics in campus-city demographics and characteristics that could drive students’
preferences. Students might prefer a specific college because dorms in this city are
modern and better-equipped or because the campus is in a lively city. We control
for university-specific factors that affect students’ preferences and are constant
over time by including a full set of university fixed effects. For example, uni-
versity fixed effects capture any “brand” or reputation effects, as well as other
time-invariant unobserved characteristics (different faculty/ student ratio by uni-
versity, level of resources), that could affect students’ preferences. We control for
these unobserved characteristics and we try to isolate the effect that changes in the
unemployment rate could have on students’ preferences to study one particular
major over another. Standard errors are clustered at the degree level.
Although the job insecurity index is only reported for different degrees in
2006, it gives us an indication about the overall job-market prospects related to
each field. Another, rather broader measure to examine economic conditions and
employment quality is the unemployment rate. We examine the time variation of
the uncertainty regarding the phase of the economy by looking at the effect of the
annual unemployment rate on the demand for degrees in various fields and years.
5.2.2 Analysis of College Majors
In this section, we investigate the effect of the annual youth unemployment on
the number of ordered applications submitted in each field with the following
regression model:
Yd,f,c,t = b0 + b1Unemploymentt + b2FieldFEf × Unemploymentt + b3FieldFEf +
b4CampusCityFEc + +b5UniversityFEf + d,f,c,t(2)
where Yi,f,c,t indicates the number of applications a degree d, in field f , in city
c, and year t attracted that reported it as top, second, third, and later choice.
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The main coefficient of interest, estimated by standard OLS, is b2 and measures
the effect of youth unemployment on the popularity of each field relative to a
benchmark field. Field fixed effects control for mean differences in the popularity
of departments that offer degrees in different fields. A field is more popular
than another when degrees in that field receive more applications that list them
in higher positions in the preference list. We include campus-city and university
fixed effects to control for unobserved time - invariant campus city- and university-
related factors. Unemployment refers to annual unemployment in the country for
people between the ages of 18 and 25 (youth unemployment), and is taken from
World Bank statistical reports. The standard errors are clustered at the degree
level.
One might worry about potential confounding factors that may have occurred
during the recession, and that could affect the demand for higher education and
for specific fields. As discussed in a previous section17, there are no college costs
(e.g. tuition and fees) that may alter students’ preferences when unemployment
rate is high. So students’ ability to take out a loan, in this case, does not seem to
be very relevant. However, one might worry that changes in the supply of degrees
could happen during a recession, and might affect students’ choices. We are able
to net out supply effects by looking at students’ preferences and not the actual
outcomes of college applications. To control for possible changes in location that
might occur, if, say, a specific university switches the campus-city where a degree
course will be offered, we add in some specifications for both university and city
campus fixed effects.
From a university perspective, we provide suggestive evidence that the number
of existing university department providing degrees in each field does not change
significantly (Table 2). Additionally, we believe that no considerable institutional
changes within or across universities that may have occurred by 2011 that could
affect the demand for higher education and/ or for specific fields. After all, any
systematic differences across institutions that are constant over time are captured
17Section 4.3
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by the university fixed effects and will not bias our estimate.
One might be concerned that the increase in the unemployment rate might co-
incide with professor salary cuts and significant drops in research funds that could
threaten universities’ quality. Any concerns about falling in academic standards
and differences in university quality due to the recession are alleviated by the fact
that our analysis stops in 2011, when harsh austerity measures had not yet been
implemented. For robustness, we include a full set of university-specific, linear
time trends to control for any unobserved factors that could change over time
within universities. Another worry could be that some campus-city might expe-
rience a stronger deterioration in the services that they provide (entertainment,
library closures, dorms, etc), and thus they might become less or more appealing
to students after 2009. To address the concern that there could be campus-city
trends in unobserved factors correlated with the unemployment rate, we add to
the above regression model a full set of campus-specific, linear time trends.
5.3 University admission cut-offs
Degree cut-offs express students’ valuations for the corresponding degrees. Table
10 provides a list with the ranking of fields based on their average cut-off values in
the period 2005-2011. The factors determining the admission cut-offs are discussed
in details in a previous section (Section 2.2). A higher demand for specific fields,
as a result of the business cycle, might increase the admission cut-offs of related
university departments. This would make admission to specific degree programs
more difficult.
To investigate the effect of students’ preferences over specific degrees on de-
grees’ cut-off marks, we propose the following regression:
DegreeCutoffd,f,c,t = b0 + b1NumberofF irstChoiceApplicationsd,c,t +
b9Controlsd,f,c,t+b3FieldFEf+b7Y earFEt+b4CityFEc+b5UniversityFEf+d,f,c,t(3)
We regress the cut-off score of a degree d in field f in city c and year t on
the number of applications submitted as students’ first (but also second, third
and later) choice as well as other controls. The main controls are some annual
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variables, such as the proportion of females, the proportion of students from pub-
lic or private schools, the aggregate supply of university seats, a measure for the
easiness of the exam, a dummy if the tertiary academic institution is an academic
university or a university of applied sciences (a technological educational insti-
tutes)18 measure for the easiness of the exam.19 To control for field, time, campus
city and university unobserved heterogeneity we include field, time, campus city,
and university fixed effects.
6 Main Results
Figure 4 displays the proportion of first-choice applications submitted for degree
programs in each field averaged over all years in the sample. It shows that the
largest percentage of college applicants aspire to study the field consisting of Ed-
ucation, Greek and Foreign Language departments and the smallest percentage
Home Economics. Figure 5 shows the weighted popularity index of degree pro-
grams submitted as first choice in each field averaged over all years in the sample.
The fields that receives the most first-choice applications given their supply over
all years are Law and Psychology. The least number of first-choice applications
are submitted to Agriculture and Forestry departments.
This analysis considers 22 major categories. Table 4 details good employment
majors versus poor employment majors as indicated by the value of the degree in-
security index in 2006. The higher the job insecurity is, the worse the employment
prospects are. The job insecurity index takes values from 1 to 1.5 for degrees that
18Technological educational institutes (or universities of applied sciences) offer undergraduate
programs. They offer four-years degrees, and are recognised by the state. Twelfth-grade stu-
dents who take national exams can report in their preference list degrees from both: academic
universities and technological educational institutes. Since 2008 these institutions have offered
postgraduate degree programs that lead to a master’s degree.
19We calculate the average national exam performance of students who take the national exams
each year. Assuming that cohorts are of similar academic quality across time, the only change
from one year to another is the overall difficulty of the exam. If the overall performance in one
year is greater than that of another year, then we assume that the exams were on average easier
that year.
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are characterized by “ good employment prospects,” 1.5 to 2 for “ mediocre em-
ployment prospects,” 2 to 2.5 for “ poor employment prospects,” and 2.5 to 3 for
“ very poor employment prospects.” For example, for the enrolling cohort of 2006,
studying Engineering and Computer Science offers better employment prospects
than studying Agriculture and Forestry; a student embarking on a degree course
in Social Political and European Studies faces worse employment prospects than
a student studying Mathematics and Statistics.
6.1 Degree Preferences and Employment Prospects
Table 5 reports OLS results using equation (1) for the 2006 cohort. In Panel
A, we regress the number of degree applications submitted as top, second and
third option on a degree job insecurity index. The estimates are negative across
specifications and statistically significant. When the job insecurity index of a
specific degree increases by 1, then the related degree receives 62, 50 and 40 fewer
applications listing it as the first, second and third option, respectively (columns 1,
4 and 7). For example, a degree that has good employment prospects (i.e. a degree
in the department of Police and Military with job insecurity index=1.08) receives
on average 62, 50 or 40 more first, second and third option applications than
a degree that has poor employment prospects (i.e. a degree in the department
of Journalism with job insecurity index=2.2 ). In columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9
we add university, field and campus-city fixed effects to control for unobserved
heterogeneity at the university, field and campus-city level. Our estimates remain
negative and statistically significant. Changes in the degree job insecurity index
affect more students’ first choice preferences, as in it indicated by the higher in
magnitude coefficients compared to their second and third choices.
In Panel B, we regress the number of degree applications submitted as top,
second and third option on a field job insecurity index. We find that when the
job insecurity index associated with a field increases by 1 (for example if biology’s
employment prospects change from good to mediocre), then the related degree
receives 53, 44 and 33 fewer applications that list it as first, second and third
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options respectively (columns 1,4 and 7). The inclusion of campus-city and uni-
versity fixed effects in columns 2, 5, 8, and 3, 6, 9, respectively, hardly affects the
results. Results from both panels support our hypothesis, that students react to
changes in the economy and employment prospects related to specific degrees and
fields. Students seem to prefer degrees and fields that include a low job insecurity
index and imply better employment prospects.
6.2 Unemployment and Fields of Study
We then look at the effect of time-varying youth unemployment on the demand
for specific fields of study while we look for the whole sample. Tables 6 and 7
report OLS estimates using equation (2). We find that a unit increase in youth
unemployment increases the number of applications each degree receives by ap-
proximately 1 on average (Table 6). We examine the effect of the unemployment
rate on the demand for degree applications submitted as first choice (Table 6,
columns 1 and 2), second choice (Table 6, columns 3 and 4), third choice (Table
7, columns 1 and 2) and later choice (Table 7, columns 3 and 4). The omitted field
here is Economics. So, the effect of unemployment on the popularity of each field
is interpreted compared to Economics. We use economics as our benchmark ma-
jor, because the changes in the Weighted Popularity Index of Economics degrees
over the years are relatively small, as shown in Table 4.
To start with, a unit increase in youth unemployment causes an one unit
decrease in the number of first-, second-, and third-choice applications each uni-
versity department offering a Business and Management degree receives on aver-
age. On the other hand, a unit increase in unemployment induces the number
of first-, second-, and third-choice applications to each university department of-
fering a Psychology degree to rise by approximately 17, 11 and 11 respectively.
The potential increase in the prevalence of depression and mental health during
the financial crisis (Caroli and Godard, 2016; Cooper, 2011; McInerney et al.,
2013; Uutela, 2010) may explain the rise in the popularity of Psychology degrees.
Similarly, a unit increase in youth unemployment increases the number of top-,
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second-, and third-choice applications each university department offering a Law
degree receives by approximately 20, 13 and 10, respectively.
During the recession, there is an increase in students’ reported top, second
and third preference for destinations such as Military and Naval Academies and
fields such as Mathematics and Statistics, Humanities and Liberal Art, Nursing,
Veterinary Science, Pharmacy, Medicine, Psychology, Journalism, Biology, and
Law. Conversely, Home Economics, Business and Management, Engineering and
Computer Science fall in popularity during the crisis. Our findings are in parallel
with job categorizations presented in Shatkin (2008)20 who report that job oppor-
tunities in the Military and Health Care sectors are relatively less affected during
economic turmoil. Furthermore, as he reports, the wage gap across sectors dimin-
ishes during a recession, and thus Humanities and Liberal Art jobs become more
popular, as opposed to Engineering and Computer Science jobs. The construction
industry suffers heavily during the recent recession, in Greece, as housebuilding,
public infrastructure and major development projects stalled.
It’s interesting to explicitly look at the effect of the unemployment rate on the
popularity of degrees that guarantee an early source of income: degrees from Po-
lice, Military as well as Naval Academies.21 Our findings show that a unit increase
in youth unemployment causes a 2-, 3- and 4- units increase, respectively, in the
number of top-, second-, and third-, choice applications each military academy
receives on average. In addition, a unit increase in unemployment lead the num-
20Shatkin (2008) book “150 Best Recession-Proof Jobs” examines the most secure jobs for the
U.S. market. Using databases of the U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Census Bureau, and
occupational outlook ratings from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which projects job growth and
future job openings for more than 750 occupations, the author identified various jobs’ sensitivity
to changes in the economy and the projected outlook for jobs for the next 10 years. The author
also lists the most recession-proof metropolitan areas and states, the most recession-proof skills,
and the jobs that are very sensitive to recession.
21Naval academies are Military Academies. Their main responsibility is to educate and train
competent Naval Officers for the Hellenic Navy. The academies also educate Deck and Engi-
neering Naval cadets. They also educate Supply Officer cadets as well as Coast Guard Officer
cadets.
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ber of top and second choice applications each naval academy receives to rise by
approximately 42 and 32 respectively. The military in Greece permits students to
enlist and pursue tertiary education at the same time.22 Individuals who join the
armed forces sign an enlistment contract, binding them to service after graduation;
in exchange, they immediately begin receiving a monthly stipend. In addition,
immediately after completing their degrees at naval academies, graduates are
guaranteed work serving on ships, and offered certain specialized training free of
cost. Moreover, they have the opportunity to pursue high-paying careers as cap-
tains or engineers in commercial shipping. Greece’s commercial shipping industry
remained among the strongest in the world even during the recent recession, and
therefore, employees of ship companies suffered few layoffs, and experienced low
or no reductions in wages.
In Figure 6, we draw the percentage of college applications that listed military
and police academies as their number-one choice over time (in the left panel).
We see that it follows a pattern similar to that of youth unemployment (right
panel) with time lag. This is natural as students report preferences based on
expectations.
Our results in Tables 6 and 7 are fully aligned with the findings of Arcidiacono
(2004) who suggests that college students tend to switch away from degrees that
are relatively more challenging (i.e. engineering and computer science) when these
degrees don’t promise higher economic returns in comparison to other available
degrees. Arcidiacono (2004) specifically mentions that fewer students choose to
major in business or engineering, when no return premium is anticipated after
graduation. We find that a unit increase in youth unemployment decreases the
number of first-, second-, and third-choice applications each university engineering
program receives by 0.4-0.5 on average.
We also report the effect of unemployment on the number of later-choice ap-
22Interested students include combined choices in their preference list. For example one may
list “Economics major while in the armed forces”. Both men and women can enlist in the armed
forces.
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plications23 submitted to university departments. As we explained in a previous
section (Section 2.2), college applications in Greece bear no cost. In a framework
of cost-less applications, each individual has incentive to include every department
in their preference list. Potentially, the only difference from one preference list to
the next applicant’s list is the ordering of the university departments. However,
the direction of the effect of the unemployment rate on later choice applications
indicated in columns (3) and (4) (Table 7) is not much different than before. For
example, a unit increase in unemployment reduces later choice applications (out-
side top 3 applications) received by Agriculture and Forestry, and Business and
Management departments by 18 and 20, respectively, or 28 and 16 respectively
when university fixed effects are included. On the other hand, Police, Military
and Naval Academies receive more later-choice applications when unemployment
rises. As before, Law, Medicine, and Psychology departments become more popu-
lar when the overall uncertainty in the economy increases. Results remain almost
unchanged when university fixed effects are included.
To make sure that our results for the effect of unemployment on the de-
mand for different fields are not driven by university- or campus-city-specific time
trends, that are correlated with the unemployment rate, we include a university-
or campus-city-specific linear time trend. These robustness results are presented
in Tables 8 and 9. Some coefficients slightly change while some others become
statistically insignificant. A couple coefficients flip sign, but they become statis-
tically insignificant. Overall, our results remain unchanged regarding which fields
experience a drop or a rise in popularity when unemployment rises.
6.3 University Admission Thresholds
Then we look at the effect of students’ reported college preferences on degrees’
cut-off scores. If the supply of seats is constant over time, but competition for
those seats grows, then the degree threshold score should increase. This happens
23Students’ submitted applications outside their top-three choices. For example, students’
top-four choice, top-five choice, ..., top N-choice.
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because, for a given supply, the admission score of the last student admitted
should be higher when there is more competition24 over the seats. First, we rank
the university fields based on the related degrees’ threshold values over the sample
period. Table 10 shows that dentistry is the field with the highest cut-off value for
the period 2005-2011. This means that among all fields, the most difficult one for
admission (the one with the highest cut-off threshold score), over the period of 7
years, is Dentistry. Second and third most difficult fields for university admission
are Medicine and Pharmacy, respectively. Over the period of 7 years that is our
sample period, naval academies rank low in terms of admission thresholds. But
what is interesting is that, as the unemployment rate increases, Naval academies
become more popular and possibly more difficult to enter.
Then in Table 11 we present OLS estimates for equation (3). Results suggest
a positive relationship between the number of first-, second-, and third-choice ap-
plications and the degree-admission threshold. Columns 1-3, shows that for each
additional first choice application a degree receives, the threshold score increases
by 2,331 when only field fixed effects are included. This estimate drops to 1.381
when year fixed effects are included and becomes 1.519 when campus city and
university fixed effects are included. The average degree cutoff in the sample is
12,084.91 (with a s.d of 4,506.325). This means that for each additional unit of
unemployment, the threshold for Psychology departments will increase by approx-
imately (17.005*1.519) 25.8, ceteris paribus. If the unemployment rate increases
by one, then Medicine, Naval, and Mathematics and Statistics departments will
experience a rise in their thresholds by around 15.3, 63 and 3.8 respectively, ce-
teris paribus. These numbers translate to 1 percent , 2.5 percent and 0.8 percent
of the respective cut-off s.d. for degrees in medicine, Naval and, Mathematics and
Statistics. For an additional second and third choice application a degree receives,
the related degree admission threshold increases by 2.275 and 2.574 respectively,
ceteris paribus.
24The only exception to this could be if the average academic quality of students applying to
this specific degree drops on average. However, we have no reasons to believe that the average
cohort academic quality varies by time.
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In columns 10, 11 and 12 we examine if there is any effect on the admission
threshold coming from later-choice applications. As we expected, there is a nega-
tive and statistically insignificant relationship between the number of later-choices
applications and degree admission cut-offs. This might be the case because stu-
dents list many degrees in low positions in the preference list as a risk aversion
practice. Students might report degrees that cover a large range of cut-off values
in order to make sure that they will be admitted to some university department
even if this year’s admission threshold drops significantly. Keep in mind that when
students submit their degree applications, the actual degree admission thresholds
are not determined or announced. Potentially, students have incentives to report
all university departments in the field they aspire to study or potentially degrees
from other fields too. Thus, intuitively the number of later-choice applications
should not matter for degrees’ threshold determinations.
7 Conclusions
This paper provides the first examination of switching college majors of study
as a result of the financial crisis that began in Greece in 2009. We identify the
relationship between youth unemployment and the demand for specific college
degrees nationwide, while netting out supply-side dynamics. We focus primarily
on the abrupt expansion of the Greek college application rate, and its fluctuation
around the financial crisis. We document this expansion and develop a theory of
the demand for post-secondary education that stresses the importance of short-run
economic conditions in the decision-making of “marginal applicants.” Finally, we
advance a body of empirical evidence that supports a number of the inferences of
the theory regarding the role of anticipated job prospects in educational decisions.
We use unique administrative data from Greece for all existing degree pro-
grams to study whether and how students’ preferences and degree admission
thresholds depend on degree-, and field-related employment prospects. Using
panel data for the universe of degrees over a seven-year period, we find the fol-
lowing: First, we show that college applicants prefer degrees and majors with
28
lower job insecurity. Second, we find that changes in the unemployment rate have
different effects on demand for different college majors. Indicatively, we find a
decrease in the popularity of academically rigorous degrees in Engineering and
Computer Science. We also document a decrease in the popularity of Business
and Management, Journalism and Home Economics during the recession. During
the crisis more people turn to Naval Academies, Police and Military Academies,
which allow students to enlist and pursue tertiary education at the same time.
Student in these degree programs are also guaranteed an early source of income
that may begin with enrollment in the academy itself. For example, those who join
the army sign an enlistment contract, binding them to serve after graduation, and
then immediately begin receiving a monthly stipend. When the unemployment
rate rises, we find an increase for the medical-related majors-such as Medicine,
Pharmacy, Nursing and Dentistry that lead to high-paying medical employment.
We also find an increase in the popularity of Psychology degrees. We speculate
that the rise in the incidence of mental health issues during the recession may
explain the increase in the popularity of Psychology degrees.
Third, we find that top choice-college applications influence degrees’ admission
thresholds, making enrollement in degrees with a low employment-insecurity index
at the time of the recession more competitive. Our findings contribute to the
understanding of workforce dynamics and occupational choice during economic
downturns and can inform policies that fight unemployment. Understanding the
flows of post-secondary education preferences during the recession might also help
to a more optimal allocation of resources.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on college applicants
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
If admitted 0.815 0.388 0 1
Number of applications 24.661 21.435 1 290
Rank of admitted college in prefer-
ence list
8.041 9.981 1 238
Mobile students 0.699 0.458 0 1
Female 0.565 0.496 0 1
Age 17.98 1.139 15 66
Repeat 0.112 0.316 0 1
Cohort size 62,257 8,896 50,061 70,868
Aggregate Enrollment 60,257 6,799 52,450 69,631
Note: Data span seven cohorts from 2005 to 2011. Number of schools: 1403.
Among those 442 high schools are in Athens or the surrounding suburbs. Mobile
students are those who move to a different city in order to study.
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Table 2: # university department offering degrees in various fields
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Engineering and computer science 105 105 105 105 110 110 110
Agriculture and forestry 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Economics 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Mathematics and Statistics 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Business and Management 67 67 67 67 70 70 70
Biology 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Other 48 48 50 50 53 53 53
Physics and Earth Science 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Liberal Arts and Humanities 22 23 23 23 23 23 23
Psychology 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Social, Political and European Studies 12 12 12 12 13 13 13
Nursing and other Health 31 31 32 32 36 36 36
Journalism 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Education, Language, History and P.E. 67 67 67 68 68 68 68
Home economics 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Medicine 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Pharmacy 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Law 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Veterinary Science 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Dentistry 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Police and Military 25 25 25 25 24 26 26
Naval Academies 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Total # of available degrees 482 483 486 487 502 504 504
# of new high school graduates 70,560 68,067 53,552 52,430 50,061 70,868 69,545
# of college applicants 85,343 82,003 70,759 65,932 63,187 75,904 96,953
Note: The table shows the number of existing university departments in each field and year. The # of college
applicants consists of the # of new high school graduates plus the # of students of returning applicants.
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Table 3: Evolution of Weighted Popularity Index over time and fields
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Engineering and computer science 194 164 127 115 103 122 149
Agriculture and forestry 73 45 32 31 30 49 58
Economics 181 167 163 152 147 163 185
Mathematics and Statistics 113 127 128 111 142 164 188
Business and Management 180 154 133 113 93 105 135
Biology 109 143 104 103 96 138 190
Other 92 68 46 45 37 70 68
Physics and Earth Science 102 100 95 97 103 120 136
Liberal Arts and Humanities 94 97 82 82 73 117 130
Psychology 419 510 443 378 312 525 791
Social, Political and European Studies 94 101 111 95 110 130 131
Nursing and other Health 147 184 134 129 108 203 208
Journalism 167 131 145 133 108 163 152
Education, Language, History and P.E. 230 262 240 238 228 225 304
Home economics 67 74 113 102 73 44 25
Medicine 298 287 249 261 274 222 527
Pharmacy 182 225 227 258 235 295 360
Law 871 1016 995 943 815 762 1470
Veterinary Science 95 98 82 80 70 126 177
Dentistry 289 278 249 267 269 265 346
Police and Military 290 298 277 227 261 280 343
Naval Academies 691 293 212 192 170 405 1226
Youth Unemployment (%) 25.3 24.8 22.5 22.0 25.5 32.4 44.1
Mean # applicants 174 169 145 135 125 149 188
Note: The table shows ratio between total number of college applications listing a university
department in a particular field as their number one choice in some year over the number of
existing university departments in that field in that year. Source of youth unemployment data:
World Bank. Mean # applicants is the ratio of the total number of applicants over the number
of existing university departments in a given year.
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Table 4: College Majors and Respective Job Insecurity Index
Insecurity Index :
>=1 and <1.5 >=1.5 and <=2 >2 and <=2.5 >2.5 and 3
Employment Prospects are:
Good Mediocre Poor Very Poor
Economics Mathematics and Statistics Education, Greek, Agriculture and Forestry
Engineering and Computer science Business and Management Foreign languages and P.E. Liberal Art and Humanities
Biology Physics and Earth Science Social Political and European Studies Home Economics






Note: We derive a field-specific job insecurity index using the job insecurity index for each university department (degree). This measure is
constructed using data from series of long-term questionnaire surveys of college graduates in Greece published in Katsikas (2006). This index refers
to students who apply to university departments in year 2006.
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Table 5: Effect of job insecurity on college applications in year 2006
Panel A: Effect of university-specific insecurity on demand for university degrees
Dependent Variable: Number of Degree Applications submitted as
Top Choice Second Choice Third Choice
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Degree Job Insecurity -62.100 -55.587 -55.883 -50.562 -43.327 -44.262 -40.423 -32.594 -43.123
(12.402)*** (13.452)*** (22.712)** (8.261)*** (9.058)*** (13.325)*** (7.425)*** (8.464)*** (9.975)***
Campus city FE X X X X X X
Field FE X X X
University FE X X X
R2 0.04 0.19 0.44 0.06 0.20 0.45 0.05 0.20 0.32
Observations 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483
Panel B: Effect of field-specific insecurity on demand for university degrees
Dependent Variable: Number of Degree Applications submitted as
Top Choice Second Choice Third Choice
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Field Job Insecurity -53.449 -60.142 -57.496 -44.128 -39.023 -49.063 -33.087 -23.507 -41.610
(20.510)*** (24.176)** (17.601)*** (13.073)*** (15.838)** (15.291)*** (10.727)*** (12.453)* (14.594)***
Campus city FE X X X X X X
University FE X X X
R2 0.01 0.17 0.33 0.02 0.18 0.29 0.01 0.18 0.28
Observations 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483
Note: A constant is also included. Standard errors are clustered at the degree level. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level
respectively.
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Table 6: The effect of unemployment on first and second choice applications
Top Choice Second Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment 1.053 0.656 1.311 1.146
(0.000)*** (0.293)** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Computer Science and Engineering -0.448 -0.008 -0.623 -0.494
(0.041)*** (0.257) (0.037)*** (0.231)**
Unemployment × Agriculture and Forestry -0.135 0.502 -0.498 -0.014
(0.000)*** (0534) (0.000)*** (0.361)
Unemployment × Mathematics and Statistics 2.274 2.671 1.776 1.940
(0.000)*** (0.393)*** (0.000)*** (0.219)***
Unemployment × Business and Management -1.069 -0.477 -1.393 -1.180
(0.055)*** (0.395) (0.027)*** (0.268)***
Unemployment × Biology 2.762 3.159 2.216 2.379
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Other -0.341 0.922 -0.323 0.184
(0.020)*** (0.313)** (0.024)*** (0.237)
Unemployment × Physics and Earth Science 0.830 1.057 0.600 0.788
(0.000)*** (0.308)*** (0.000)*** (0.221)***
Unemployment × Liberal Arts and Humanities 1.263 1.565 0.859 0.989
(0.005)*** (0.323)*** (0.006)*** (0.243)***
Unemployment × Psychology 16.608 17.005 11.428 11.591
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Social, Political and European Studies 1.332 1.810 1.127 1.060
(0.289)*** (0.450)*** (0.038)*** (0.249)***
Unemployment × Nursing and other health 3.171 3.397 2.788 2.777
(0.084)*** (0.314)*** (0.565)*** (0.246)***
Unemployment × Journalism -0.107 0.290 0.827 0.990
(0.000)*** (0.293) (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Education, Language, History and P.E. 1.494 1.692 0.648 0.745
(0.009)*** (0.316)*** (0.007)*** (0.233)***
Unemployment × Home Economics -4.527 -4.130 -3.126 -2.963
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Medicine 9.632 10.028 6.827 6.990
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Pharmacy 5.330 5.727 2.945 3.109
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Law 19.737 20.134 13.088 13.251
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Veterinary Science 3.439 3.836 3.243 3.406
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Dentistry 2.337 2.734 2.663 2.827
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Police & Military 2.355 2.925 3.623 3.891
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.026)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Naval Academies 41.531 41.928 32.698 32.861
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Fields and Campus F.E. X X X X
University F.E. X X
R2 0.32 0.42 0.37 0.45
Note: An intercept is included. Number of observations: 3,448 degrees. 43 universities are used. Economics is used as
the benchmark field. Standard error are clustered at the field level.
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Table 7: The effect of unemployment on third and later choice applications
Third Choice Outside Top3 Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment 1.396 1.279 16.967 12.753
(0.000)*** (0.291)** (0.000)*** (4.021)**
Unemployment × Computer Science and Engineering -0.555 -0.413 19.317 21.381
(0.000)*** (0.296) (0.471)*** (4.021)**
Unemployment × Agriculture and Forestry -0.450 -0.029 -18.800 -28.315
(0.000)*** (0.416) (0.000)*** (9.950)**
Unemployment × Mathematics and Statistics 1.249 1.366 13.522 17.736
(0.000)*** (0.291)*** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Business and Management -1.359 -1.197 -20.030 -16.442
(0.101)*** (0.278)*** (0.948)*** (5.127)***
Unemployment × Biology 2.077 2.194 67.383 71.596
(0.000)*** (0.291)*** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Other -0.406 -0.306 23.332 23.746
(0.018)*** (0.349) (0.639)*** (5.225)***
Unemployment × Physics and Earth Science 0.912 1.017 10.221 8.841
(0.000)*** (0.319)** (0.000)*** (4.616)*
Unemployment × Liberal Arts and Humanities 0.649 0.662 41.517 49.244
(0.004)*** (0.338)* (0.766)*** (4.426)***
Unemployment × Psychology 11.333 11.450 36.944 41.158
(0.000)*** (0.291)*** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Social, Political and European Studies 0.980 1.053 64.637 71.129
(0.517)*** (0.496)** (0.981)*** (3.484)***
Unemployment × Nursing and other health 3.528 3.545 151.288 158.163
(0.053)*** (0.298)*** (1.182)*** (3.883)***
Unemployment × Journalism 0.783 0.900 102.023 106.237
(0.517)*** (0.291)** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Education, Language, History and P.E. 0.167 0.275 21.793 23.937
(0.008)*** (0.308) (0.142)*** (4.976)***
Unemployment × Home Economics -3.167 -3.050 -34.510 -30.296
(0.000)*** (0.291)*** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Medicine 6.488 6.604 35.548 39.762
(0.000)*** (0.291)*** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Pharmacy 2.624 2.741 53.548 58.049
(0.000)*** (0.291)*** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Law 9.949 10.066 16.729 20.942
(0.000)*** (0.291)*** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Veterinary Science 0.478 0.594 30.461 34.675
(0.000)*** (0.291)* (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Dentistry 0.291 0.408 43.496 47.710
(0.000)*** (0.291) (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Police & Military 3.684 3.903 8.794 13.408
(0.024)*** (0.291)*** (0.214)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Naval Academies 5.336 5.452 57.544 61.759
(0.000)*** (0.291)*** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Fields and Campus F.E. X X X X
University F.E. X X
R2 0.32 0.39 0.37 0.43
Note: An intercept is included. Number of observations: 3,448 degrees. 43 universities are used. Economics is used as
the benchmark field. Standard error are clustered at the field level.
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Table 8: Robustness checks: Campus and University Linear Time Trends
Top Choice Second Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment 3.167 3.162 2.968 2.670
(0.530)*** (0.380)*** (0.469)*** (0.329)***
Unemployment × Computer Science and Engineering -0.235 -0.028 -0.078 0.266
(0.127)* (0.405) (0.124) (0.352)
Unemployment × Agriculture and Forestry 0.091 -0.692 0.058 0.044
(0.138) (0.404) (0.146) (0.333)
Unemployment × Mathematics and Statistics 2.423 2.194 1.825 1.686
(0.230)*** (0.316)*** (0.109)*** (0.247)***
Unemployment × Business and Management -0.479 -0.092 -0.600 0.174
(0.093)*** (0.404) (0.094)*** (0.377)
Unemployment × Biology 2.912 1.789 2.811 2.151
(0.211)*** (0.321)*** (0.140)*** (0.288)***
Unemployment × Physics and Earth Science 0.791 -0.172 0.646 0.379
(0.174)*** (0.356) (0.141)*** (0.370)
Unemployment × Liberal Arts and Humanities 1.173 0.527 0.932 0.715
(0.128)*** (0.559) (0.113)*** (0.422)*
Unemployment × Psychology 16.255 15.653 11.093 10.884
(0.317)*** (0.427)*** (0.285)*** (0.316)***
Unemployment × Social, Political and European Studies 1.516 0.063 1.067 0.455
(0.341)*** (0.501) (0.135)*** (0.284)
Unemployment × Nursing and other health 3.485 3.844 3.158 3.885
(0.175)*** (0.677)*** (0.125)*** (0.532)***
Unemployment × Journalism 0.832 -0.133 1.586 1.290
(0.149)*** (0.363) (0.292)*** (0.188)***
Unemployment × Education, Language, History and P.E. 1.331 0.796 0.459 0.528
(0.062)*** (0.400)* (0.040)*** (0.326)***
Unemployment × Home Economics -3.056 -5.456 -2.356 -2.667
(0.379)*** (0.500)*** (0.197)*** (0.272)***
Unemployment × Medicine 9.545 8.604 6.985 6.422
(0.221)*** (0.332)*** (0.112)*** (0.336)***
Unemployment × Pharmacy 5.278 4.280 3.330 3.090
(0.184)*** (0.446)*** (0.231)*** (0.389)***
Unemployment × Law 19.369 18.829 12.519 12.962
(0.287)*** (0.405)*** (0.190)*** (0.427)***
Unemployment × Veterinary Science 3.264 2.058 3.470 3.114
(0.279)*** (0.458)*** (0.401)*** (0.277)***
Unemployment × Dentistry 2.426 1.131 2.948 2.468
(0.280)*** (0.556)* (0.224)*** (0.458)***
Unemployment × Police & Military 2.524 4.344 3.995 3.624
(0.250)*** (1.317)*** (0.218)*** (1.059)***
Unemployment × Naval Academies 43.002 46.221 33.470 36.633
(0.379)*** (5.740)*** (0.197)*** (4.402)***
Fields and Campus F.E. X X
Campus City Specific Linear Time Trend X X
Fields and University F.E. X X
University Specific Linear Time Trend X X
Note: An intercept is included. Number of observations: 3,448 degrees. 43 universities are used. Economics is used as the benchmark
field. Standard errors are clustered at the field level. Estimates for the category “Other” are not reported due to space constraints.
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Table 9: Robustness checks: Campus and University Linear Time Trends
Third Choice Later Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment 3.193 2.863 77.767 70.927
(0.513)*** (0.400)*** (14.843)*** (11.193)***
Unemployment × Computer Science and Engineering -0.069 0.375 47.502 60.028
(0.185) (0.263) (4.079)*** (10.068)**
Unemployment × Agriculture and Forestry -0.068 0.215 -33.412 20.013
(0.256) (0.271) (12.214)** (16.510)
Unemployment × Mathematics and Statistics 1.185 1.188 21.168 13.399
(0.204)*** (0.255)*** (5.558)*** (2.718)***
Unemployment × Business and Management -0.771 0.150 -18.508 44.460
(0.250)** (0.348) (6.319)** (14.483)***
Unemployment × Biology 2.426 1.934 89.124 60.478
(0.220)*** (0.303)*** (9.448)*** (3.597)***
Unemployment × Physics and Earth Science 0.914 0.672 25.942 11.569
(0.212)*** (0.296)** (5.768)*** (3.865)***
Unemployment × Liberal Arts and Humanities 0.693 0.444 53.401 47.560
(0.121)*** (0.286) (5.420)*** (3.497)***
Unemployment × Psychology 10.934 10.856 36.793 28.802
(0.262)*** (0.366)*** (3.937)*** (4.257)***
Unemployment × Social, Political and European Studies 0.826 0.736 66.034 62.470
(0.534) (0.274)** (4.134)*** (3.953)***
Unemployment × Nursing and other health 3.765 4.738 169.704 215.079
(0.219)*** (0.422)*** (6.471)*** (22.207)***
Unemployment × Journalism 1.282 1.251 130.280 125.705
(0.588)** (0.228)*** (27.812)*** (8.478)***
Unemployment × Education, Language, History and P.E. 0.017 0.217 25.934 21.384
(0.071) (0.281) (3.443)*** (3.579)***
Unemployment × Home Economics -2.692 -2.484 -22.857 -5.632
(0.248)*** (0.443)*** (3.210)*** (10.867)
Unemployment × Medicine 6.523 6.094 49.985 26.719
(0.244)*** (0.341)*** (8.929)*** (4.085)***
Unemployment × Pharmacy 2.926 2.615 61.664 51.164
(0.211)*** (0.370)*** (4.245)*** (3.982)***
Unemployment × Law 9.649 9.773 8.038 7.798
(0.424)*** (0.542)*** (3.165)*** (3.965)***
Unemployment × Veterinary Science 0.911 0.305 75.797 23.881
(0.426)** (0.273) (29.541)*** (5.302)***
Unemployment × Dentistry 0.476 -0.002 49.951 38.173
(0.162)*** (0.527) (3.845)*** (4.844)***
Unemployment × Police & Military 4.081 2.325 12.506 -36.243
(0.272)*** (0.408)*** (3.994)*** (11.149)***
Unemployment × Naval Academies 5.811 5.242 69.198 19.772
(0.248)*** (0.684)*** (3.210)*** (18.507)
Fields and Campus F.E. X X
Campus City Linear Time Trend X X
Fields and University F.E. X X
University Linear Time Trend X X
Note: An intercept is included. Number of observations: 3,448 degrees. 43 universities are used. Economics is used as the benchmark field.
Standard errors are clustered at the field level. Estimates for the category “Other” are not reported due to space constraints.
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Military and police 16,601 4
Veterinary Science 16,157 5
Law 16,058 6
Psychology 15,493 7
Home Economics 14,659 8
Biology 14,437 9
Mathematics and Statistics 13,119 10
Education,Language, History and P.E 12,937 11
Engineering and Computer Science 12,510 12
Physics and Earth Science 12,442 13
Social,Political and European Studies 12,162 14
Journalism 11,899 15
Economics 11,813 16
Nursing and Other Health 11,442 17
Liberal Art and Humanities 11,358 18
Business and Management 10,571 19
Other 10,372 10
Agriculture and Forestry 9,165 21
Naval Academies 7,851 22
Note: The “threshold score” or the “cut-off score” for admission for most
university departments varies from 0 to 20,000. The higher the threshold
value is, the more difficult it is for a student to gain admission. Some
university departments require students to take exams in “special subjects”
(for example some Architecture departments require students to take an
exam in architectural design) and the maximum threshold value for these
degrees could exceed 20,000.
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Table 11: The effect of the demand for degrees on the degree cut-off scores
Dependent Variable: Degree Cut-off score
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Number of:
First choice Applications 2.331 1.381 1.519
(0.394)*** (0.366)*** (0.343)***
Second choice Applications 3.518 2.035 2.275
(0.699)*** (0.695)*** (0.645)***
Third choice Applications 3.607 2.527 2.574
(0.564)*** (0.527)*** (0.548)***
Later choice Applications -0.016 -0.031 -0.028
(0.048) (0.047) (0.044)
Aggregate supply of seats -0.030 -0.011 -0.011 -0.007
(0.006)*** (0.006)* (0.006)* (0.006)
Easiness of the exam 3.152 3.070 3.067 3.175
(0.333)*** (0.331)*** (0.326)*** (0.335)***
Field FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X
Campus city FE X X X X X X X X
University FE X X X X
Observations 2,746 2,746 2,746 2,746 2,746 2,746 2,746 2,746 2,746 2,746 2,746 2,746
Note: A constant is also included. Standard errors are clustered at the degree level. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively. In columns
(1), (4), (7) and (10), we also control for the annual percentage of girls, annual percentage of students attending a public school/private and experimental school, a
dummy if the tertiary institution is an academic university or a technical academy and the annual percentage of students attending an urban school. The average
degree cut-off in the sample is 12,084.91 (with a s.d of 4,506.325).
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Figure 1: Number of applications and order of the unique application outcome
per year
This figure shows the number of degrees students report in their preference
lists on average. These reported degrees are equivalent to degree applications.
Students compile a list with any degree offered in the country they would like to
be admitted to. This figure also shows the order of the unique degree (application
outcome) students are accepted.
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Figure 2: Number of total college applicants and youth unemployment over time
The left figure shows the number of college applicants over time and the right
figure shows the evolution of the youth unemployment rate over time. Sample
period: 2005-2011. Source for unemployment data: World Bank.
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Figure 3: Number of total college applicants separated into new high school grad-
uates and returning applicants
This figure shows: a) The total number of college applicants, b) The number
of new-high school graduates (who who graduate from high school the year
they apply to college) and c) The number of returning students (those who had
graduated in a previous year and they reapply for college admission).
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Figure 4: Number of applications submitted as top choices per field
This figure shows the numbers of first choice applications submitted to degrees
in each field. These numbers are averaged over all years in the sample.
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Figure 5: Percentage of applications submitted as top choices per field
This figure shows the percentage of students who submitted a first choice appli-
cation to degrees in each field. These percentages are calculated using all years
in the sample.
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Figure 6: Preference for Military/ Police/ Naval Academies and Youth Unem-
ployment
The left figure depicts the percentage of college applicants per year that listed
military or police or naval related majors as their most preferred choice. The right
figure shows annual youth unemployment rate (%). Source for unemployment
data: World Bank.
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